

EXPERTS CALL FOR AN ARMY OF 1,000,000

Mobile Regular Force of 500,000 Needed to Repel Invasion.

ALL U. S. DANGER AREAS POINTED OUT

WASHINGTON, Dec. 10.—Warning the nation that Germany could send an expedition of 350,000 men to American shores within fifteen days, the War College division of the General Staff in a report to Secretary Garrison urges an enormous increase in the regular army. Expenditures of more than \$500,000,000 in 1917 are proposed to place the army of the United States on a proper basis of expansion and growth.

Although urging a plan of organization somewhat similar to that proposed by Secretary Garrison and endorsed by President Wilson, the recommendations of the army experts exceed by huge amounts the estimates in money and men which have been incorporated in the Administration's army program. This is the report that Republican members of Congress have been demanding for some time. It represents the minimum which the experts believe should be done to put the country on a preparedness basis so far as its land forces are concerned. Mr. Garrison, realizing that there was no hope of obtaining from Congress what the experts demanded, and so he sought to compromise. The General Staff's report was prepared at the request of Secretary Garrison, who later delayed making it public until after his own proposals had been published.

1,000,000 Men by 1924.

The Administration programme calls for the raising in 1917 of 100,000 men, including those in the regular army, the continental army and the National Guard. The report of the experts urges that by 1924 there shall be 1,000,000 men in the active list and in reserve, regular army and continental army, more than 1,000,000 men. Whereas Secretary Garrison's plan, which the President has approved, calls for an expenditure of \$122,717,281, the experts urge an expenditure during the same year of \$193,325,746.

Setting it forth as the principle upon which their recommendations are based, the report states that the United States must have a mobile army in time of war sufficient to fight on any point along either coast line where there are no land fortifications to repel a landing. The report of the experts goes into a careful analysis of the military situation of the big Powers of Europe and the Far East could transport to the United States in a specified time.

The report shows that Germany and Austria-Hungary together are sufficiently supplied with transports to land in this country in six weeks two expeditions totalling 1,000,000 officers and men. The United States has only 100,000 men in the United States navy were unable to intercept the transports.

On the same assumption Japan in two months could land 235,000 troops, though equipped troops provided with means of trenching themselves at some selected points on the Pacific coast pending arrival of further reinforcements and reinforcements.

Germany alone in forty-six days, the experts say, could land 27,000 troops. The United States could land 17,000 troops in the first expedition and 440,000 troops in the second expedition thirty days later.

"From what has been stated," reads the report, "we are forced to the conclusion that we must be prepared to resist a land attack by sea operation of formidable strength. The United States has no land army and no land army has been built up in the past. The only land army that we have is the National Guard, which is not a permanent force and is not trained for war."

"The enemy being unable to gain a foothold in any of these fortified areas," the report says, "the United States must be prepared to resist a land attack by sea operation of formidable strength. The United States has no land army and no land army has been built up in the past. The only land army that we have is the National Guard, which is not a permanent force and is not trained for war."

Steps for Preparedness. Here are some of the things that the army experts say as regards the steps to be taken to put the United States on a preparedness basis:

"The Philippines—A decision to defend the Philippines against a foreign invasion is a matter of national and not of local policy."

"But in studying the military requirements of such defense it must be remembered that under conditions of modern warfare the United States must have control of the sea, we cannot reinforce the Philippine garrison after a declaration of war has been made."

"Hawaii—The maintenance of the naval base at Pearl Harbor, Oahu, is an essential factor in the military problem of holding the Hawaiian Islands. These islands constitute a vital element in the defense of the Pacific coast and in securing to ourselves the full value of the Panama Canal as a strategic highway to the Pacific Ocean."

"The problem of holding the Hawaiian Islands can be solved by making Oahu, and therefore Pearl Harbor, secure against all attack. A satisfactory solution requires the joint action of the army and navy. Pearl Harbor and Honolulu are already protected from direct naval attack by fortifications now nearing completion."

SKETCHES OF NOTABLES MADE IN CORRIDORS OF THE NATIONAL CAPITOL



Rep. ALFALFA BILL MURRAY, OF OKLAHOMA



Rep. ARTHUR D. ZEPHER, OF TEXAS



Rep. CYCLONE DAVIS, OF TEXAS




Rep. CHARLES CLAUDE KITCHIN, OF NORTH CAROLINA




Rep. LINCOLN DIXON, OF INDIANA



Rep. HENRY T. RAINY, OF ILLINOIS



Rep. FRANK B. ROWLAND, OF MISSOURI



Rep. WILLIAM D. MAURY, OF MARYLAND

are already protected from direct naval attack by fortifications now nearing completion.

"These, while deemed adequate to meet the conditions existing when they were designed, must now be strengthened to meet the recent increase in power of guns afloat; but no matter how complete these harbor fortifications on the southern coast of Oahu may be they are not sufficient to protect the harbor."

"Consequently there should be in addition a force of modern submarines and destroyers forming part of the permanent naval equipment of Pearl Harbor with sufficient radius of action to keep the Hawaiian waters thoroughly patrolled throughout their whole extent and to make them dangerous for enemy vessels."

"Should this force be worsted in combat and withdrawn before the arrival of our high sea fleet the complete control of the local waters might pass temporarily to the enemy, so that the Hawaiian Islands would be in the hands of the enemy."

"The security of both Honolulu, the naval base at Pearl Harbor and indeed of the whole group depends upon including in the garrison enough mobile troops to defeat any enemy that may land anywhere on the island."

"It is clear that perfect coordination between the army and navy at this station is absolutely essential to success in holding this key to the Pacific. Unless we provide such dual defense of the Hawaiian Islands we cannot be sure of retaining control even of that part of the Pacific lying within the sphere of defense of our Western coast. By making such provision the high sea fleet is left free to meet the enemy fleet in the Pacific waters."

"Panama Canal Defense. The Panama Canal is a very important strategic position which it is our duty to hold. By our control of this canal we can prevent the effectiveness of our fleet and our general military power is enormously increased. It is therefore obvious that the security of the canal is for us a vital military need."

"The permanent garrison should be strong enough to guard the locks, spillways and other important works and to prevent a naval attack, which under modern conditions may even precede a declaration of war. We should therefore be able even in peace to man the canal with a force of 10,000 men."

"The Panama Canal is a very important strategic position which it is our duty to hold. By our control of this canal we can prevent the effectiveness of our fleet and our general military power is enormously increased. It is therefore obvious that the security of the canal is for us a vital military need."

"The Panama Canal is a very important strategic position which it is our duty to hold. By our control of this canal we can prevent the effectiveness of our fleet and our general military power is enormously increased. It is therefore obvious that the security of the canal is for us a vital military need."

"The Panama Canal is a very important strategic position which it is our duty to hold. By our control of this canal we can prevent the effectiveness of our fleet and our general military power is enormously increased. It is therefore obvious that the security of the canal is for us a vital military need."

"The Panama Canal is a very important strategic position which it is our duty to hold. By our control of this canal we can prevent the effectiveness of our fleet and our general military power is enormously increased. It is therefore obvious that the security of the canal is for us a vital military need."

"The Panama Canal is a very important strategic position which it is our duty to hold. By our control of this canal we can prevent the effectiveness of our fleet and our general military power is enormously increased. It is therefore obvious that the security of the canal is for us a vital military need."

"The Panama Canal is a very important strategic position which it is our duty to hold. By our control of this canal we can prevent the effectiveness of our fleet and our general military power is enormously increased. It is therefore obvious that the security of the canal is for us a vital military need."

"The Panama Canal is a very important strategic position which it is our duty to hold. By our control of this canal we can prevent the effectiveness of our fleet and our general military power is enormously increased. It is therefore obvious that the security of the canal is for us a vital military need."

"The Panama Canal is a very important strategic position which it is our duty to hold. By our control of this canal we can prevent the effectiveness of our fleet and our general military power is enormously increased. It is therefore obvious that the security of the canal is for us a vital military need."

"The Panama Canal is a very important strategic position which it is our duty to hold. By our control of this canal we can prevent the effectiveness of our fleet and our general military power is enormously increased. It is therefore obvious that the security of the canal is for us a vital military need."

"The Panama Canal is a very important strategic position which it is our duty to hold. By our control of this canal we can prevent the effectiveness of our fleet and our general military power is enormously increased. It is therefore obvious that the security of the canal is for us a vital military need."

"The Panama Canal is a very important strategic position which it is our duty to hold. By our control of this canal we can prevent the effectiveness of our fleet and our general military power is enormously increased. It is therefore obvious that the security of the canal is for us a vital military need."

"The Panama Canal is a very important strategic position which it is our duty to hold. By our control of this canal we can prevent the effectiveness of our fleet and our general military power is enormously increased. It is therefore obvious that the security of the canal is for us a vital military need."

"The Panama Canal is a very important strategic position which it is our duty to hold. By our control of this canal we can prevent the effectiveness of our fleet and our general military power is enormously increased. It is therefore obvious that the security of the canal is for us a vital military need."

"The Panama Canal is a very important strategic position which it is our duty to hold. By our control of this canal we can prevent the effectiveness of our fleet and our general military power is enormously increased. It is therefore obvious that the security of the canal is for us a vital military need."

"The Panama Canal is a very important strategic position which it is our duty to hold. By our control of this canal we can prevent the effectiveness of our fleet and our general military power is enormously increased. It is therefore obvious that the security of the canal is for us a vital military need."

"The Panama Canal is a very important strategic position which it is our duty to hold. By our control of this canal we can prevent the effectiveness of our fleet and our general military power is enormously increased. It is therefore obvious that the security of the canal is for us a vital military need."

"The Panama Canal is a very important strategic position which it is our duty to hold. By our control of this canal we can prevent the effectiveness of our fleet and our general military power is enormously increased. It is therefore obvious that the security of the canal is for us a vital military need."

"The Panama Canal is a very important strategic position which it is our duty to hold. By our control of this canal we can prevent the effectiveness of our fleet and our general military power is enormously increased. It is therefore obvious that the security of the canal is for us a vital military need."

"The Panama Canal is a very important strategic position which it is our duty to hold. By our control of this canal we can prevent the effectiveness of our fleet and our general military power is enormously increased. It is therefore obvious that the security of the canal is for us a vital military need."

"The Panama Canal is a very important strategic position which it is our duty to hold. By our control of this canal we can prevent the effectiveness of our fleet and our general military power is enormously increased. It is therefore obvious that the security of the canal is for us a vital military need."

"The Panama Canal is a very important strategic position which it is our duty to hold. By our control of this canal we can prevent the effectiveness of our fleet and our general military power is enormously increased. It is therefore obvious that the security of the canal is for us a vital military need."

"The Panama Canal is a very important strategic position which it is our duty to hold. By our control of this canal we can prevent the effectiveness of our fleet and our general military power is enormously increased. It is therefore obvious that the security of the canal is for us a vital military need."

"The Panama Canal is a very important strategic position which it is our duty to hold. By our control of this canal we can prevent the effectiveness of our fleet and our general military power is enormously increased. It is therefore obvious that the security of the canal is for us a vital military need."

it extremely difficult to dislodge him in this rich region an invader could maintain himself indefinitely. The harbor defenses maintained in this region are reasonably strong. Ordinary precaution demands that a mobile force of a reasonable strength be maintained also in this region.

"California Coast. There are five transcontinental lines of railway entering California—the Western Pacific and Southern Pacific by the passes through the Sierras northeast of Sacramento; the Atchafalaya, Topeka and Santa Fe and the San Pedro, Los Angeles and Salt Lake via Daguerre's Pass northeast of Los Angeles; and the Southern Pacific via the Salton Sea and Gorgona Pass southeast of Los Angeles."

"There are no other passes through the Sierras that have been considered practicable. There is no railroad running south into Lower California. Only one railroad, the Southern Pacific, runs north into Oregon. As in the Puget Sound region, communication with the East is largely dependent upon structures readily destroyed by explosives and impossible of restoration to service within a definite time; California and the greater centers of population are separated by wide expanses of sparsely settled country."

"To transport promptly large bodies of troops into California would be difficult, if not impossible, in face of opposition to the advance of the invader would have a most fertile region at its back, while the reverse would be the situation with us."

"The harbor defenses maintained in this region are reasonably strong, but they are of little use unless supported by a reasonably strong mobile force maintained in this region. To rely for defense solely upon the fixed defenses of a war upon a mobile force shipped in from the East is to invite disaster."

"Along Atlantic Coast. In case of war with a first class power on the Atlantic, that portion of our country lying between the Atlantic and the Gulf of Mexico is undoubtedly the primary object of an invader. While all other points along the Atlantic and Gulf coasts and all points on the Gulf of Mexico would undoubtedly be in danger, the danger would be secondary to that of the north Atlantic States above named. Here also the harbor defenses are reasonably strong, but they are of little use unless supported by a reasonably strong mobile force maintained in this region. To rely for defense solely upon the fixed defenses of a war upon a mobile force shipped in from the East is to invite disaster."

"The harbor defenses maintained in this region are reasonably strong, but they are of little use unless supported by a reasonably strong mobile force maintained in this region. To rely for defense solely upon the fixed defenses of a war upon a mobile force shipped in from the East is to invite disaster."

"The harbor defenses maintained in this region are reasonably strong, but they are of little use unless supported by a reasonably strong mobile force maintained in this region. To rely for defense solely upon the fixed defenses of a war upon a mobile force shipped in from the East is to invite disaster."

"The harbor defenses maintained in this region are reasonably strong, but they are of little use unless supported by a reasonably strong mobile force maintained in this region. To rely for defense solely upon the fixed defenses of a war upon a mobile force shipped in from the East is to invite disaster."

"The harbor defenses maintained in this region are reasonably strong, but they are of little use unless supported by a reasonably strong mobile force maintained in this region. To rely for defense solely upon the fixed defenses of a war upon a mobile force shipped in from the East is to invite disaster."

"The harbor defenses maintained in this region are reasonably strong, but they are of little use unless supported by a reasonably strong mobile force maintained in this region. To rely for defense solely upon the fixed defenses of a war upon a mobile force shipped in from the East is to invite disaster."

"The harbor defenses maintained in this region are reasonably strong, but they are of little use unless supported by a reasonably strong mobile force maintained in this region. To rely for defense solely upon the fixed defenses of a war upon a mobile force shipped in from the East is to invite disaster."

"The harbor defenses maintained in this region are reasonably strong, but they are of little use unless supported by a reasonably strong mobile force maintained in this region. To rely for defense solely upon the fixed defenses of a war upon a mobile force shipped in from the East is to invite disaster."

"The harbor defenses maintained in this region are reasonably strong, but they are of little use unless supported by a reasonably strong mobile force maintained in this region. To rely for defense solely upon the fixed defenses of a war upon a mobile force shipped in from the East is to invite disaster."

"The harbor defenses maintained in this region are reasonably strong, but they are of little use unless supported by a reasonably strong mobile force maintained in this region. To rely for defense solely upon the fixed defenses of a war upon a mobile force shipped in from the East is to invite disaster."

"The harbor defenses maintained in this region are reasonably strong, but they are of little use unless supported by a reasonably strong mobile force maintained in this region. To rely for defense solely upon the fixed defenses of a war upon a mobile force shipped in from the East is to invite disaster."

"The harbor defenses maintained in this region are reasonably strong, but they are of little use unless supported by a reasonably strong mobile force maintained in this region. To rely for defense solely upon the fixed defenses of a war upon a mobile force shipped in from the East is to invite disaster."

"The harbor defenses maintained in this region are reasonably strong, but they are of little use unless supported by a reasonably strong mobile force maintained in this region. To rely for defense solely upon the fixed defenses of a war upon a mobile force shipped in from the East is to invite disaster."

"The harbor defenses maintained in this region are reasonably strong, but they are of little use unless supported by a reasonably strong mobile force maintained in this region. To rely for defense solely upon the fixed defenses of a war upon a mobile force shipped in from the East is to invite disaster."

"The harbor defenses maintained in this region are reasonably strong, but they are of little use unless supported by a reasonably strong mobile force maintained in this region. To rely for defense solely upon the fixed defenses of a war upon a mobile force shipped in from the East is to invite disaster."

"The harbor defenses maintained in this region are reasonably strong, but they are of little use unless supported by a reasonably strong mobile force maintained in this region. To rely for defense solely upon the fixed defenses of a war upon a mobile force shipped in from the East is to invite disaster."

"The harbor defenses maintained in this region are reasonably strong, but they are of little use unless supported by a reasonably strong mobile force maintained in this region. To rely for defense solely upon the fixed defenses of a war upon a mobile force shipped in from the East is to invite disaster."

"The harbor defenses maintained in this region are reasonably strong, but they are of little use unless supported by a reasonably strong mobile force maintained in this region. To rely for defense solely upon the fixed defenses of a war upon a mobile force shipped in from the East is to invite disaster."

"The harbor defenses maintained in this region are reasonably strong, but they are of little use unless supported by a reasonably strong mobile force maintained in this region. To rely for defense solely upon the fixed defenses of a war upon a mobile force shipped in from the East is to invite disaster."

"The harbor defenses maintained in this region are reasonably strong, but they are of little use unless supported by a reasonably strong mobile force maintained in this region. To rely for defense solely upon the fixed defenses of a war upon a mobile force shipped in from the East is to invite disaster."

"The harbor defenses maintained in this region are reasonably strong, but they are of little use unless supported by a reasonably strong mobile force maintained in this region. To rely for defense solely upon the fixed defenses of a war upon a mobile force shipped in from the East is to invite disaster."

"The harbor defenses maintained in this region are reasonably strong, but they are of little use unless supported by a reasonably strong mobile force maintained in this region. To rely for defense solely upon the fixed defenses of a war upon a mobile force shipped in from the East is to invite disaster."

"The harbor defenses maintained in this region are reasonably strong, but they are of little use unless supported by a reasonably strong mobile force maintained in this region. To rely for defense solely upon the fixed defenses of a war upon a mobile force shipped in from the East is to invite disaster."

"The harbor defenses maintained in this region are reasonably strong, but they are of little use unless supported by a reasonably strong mobile force maintained in this region. To rely for defense solely upon the fixed defenses of a war upon a mobile force shipped in from the East is to invite disaster."

"The harbor defenses maintained in this region are reasonably strong, but they are of little use unless supported by a reasonably strong mobile force maintained in this region. To rely for defense solely upon the fixed defenses of a war upon a mobile force shipped in from the East is to invite disaster."

"The harbor defenses maintained in this region are reasonably strong, but they are of little use unless supported by a reasonably strong mobile force maintained in this region. To rely for defense solely upon the fixed defenses of a war upon a mobile force shipped in from the East is to invite disaster."

California Area—There are five transcontinental lines of railway entering California—the Western Pacific and Southern Pacific by the passes through the Sierras northeast of Sacramento; the Atchafalaya, Topeka and Santa Fe and the San Pedro, Los Angeles and Salt Lake via Daguerre's Pass northeast of Los Angeles; and the Southern Pacific via the Salton Sea and Gorgona Pass southeast of Los Angeles."

"There are no other passes through the Sierras that have been considered practicable. There is no railroad running south into Lower California. Only one railroad, the Southern Pacific, runs north into Oregon. As in the Puget Sound region, communication with the East is largely dependent upon structures readily destroyed by explosives and impossible of restoration to service within a definite time; California and the greater centers of population are separated by wide expanses of sparsely settled country."

"To transport promptly large bodies of troops into California would be difficult, if not impossible, in face of opposition to the advance of the invader would have a most fertile region at its back, while the reverse would be the situation with us."

"The harbor defenses maintained in this region are reasonably strong, but they are of little use unless supported by a reasonably strong mobile force maintained in this region. To rely for defense solely upon the fixed defenses of a war upon a mobile force shipped in from the East is to invite disaster."

"Along Atlantic Coast. In case of war with a first class power on the Atlantic, that portion of our country lying between the Atlantic and the Gulf of Mexico is undoubtedly the primary object of an invader. While all other points along the Atlantic and Gulf coasts and all points on the Gulf of Mexico would undoubtedly be in danger, the danger would be secondary to that of the north Atlantic States above named. Here also the harbor defenses are reasonably strong, but they are of little use unless supported by a reasonably strong mobile force maintained in this region. To rely for defense solely upon the fixed defenses of a war upon a mobile force shipped in from the East is to invite disaster."

"The harbor defenses maintained in this region are reasonably strong, but they are of little use unless supported by a reasonably strong mobile force maintained in this region. To rely for defense solely upon the fixed defenses of a war upon a mobile force shipped in from the East is to invite disaster."

"The harbor defenses maintained in this region are reasonably strong, but they are of little use unless supported by a reasonably strong mobile force maintained in this region. To rely for defense solely upon the fixed defenses of a war upon a mobile force shipped in from the East is to invite disaster."

"The harbor defenses maintained in this region are reasonably strong, but they are of little use unless supported by a reasonably strong mobile force maintained in this region. To rely for defense solely upon the fixed defenses of a war upon a mobile force shipped in from the East is to invite disaster."

"The harbor defenses maintained in this region are reasonably strong, but they are of little use unless supported by a reasonably strong mobile force maintained in this region. To rely for defense solely upon the fixed defenses of a war upon a mobile force shipped in from the East is to invite disaster."

"The harbor defenses maintained in this region are reasonably strong, but they are of little use unless supported by a reasonably strong mobile force maintained in this region. To rely for defense solely upon the fixed defenses of a war upon a mobile force shipped in from the East is to invite disaster."

"The harbor defenses maintained in this region are reasonably strong, but they are of little use unless supported by a reasonably strong mobile force maintained in this region. To rely for defense solely upon the fixed defenses of a war upon a mobile force shipped in from the East is to invite disaster."

"The harbor defenses maintained in this region are reasonably strong, but they are of little use unless supported by a reasonably strong mobile force maintained in this region. To rely for defense solely upon the fixed defenses of a war upon a mobile force shipped in from the East is to invite disaster."

"The harbor defenses maintained in this region are reasonably strong, but they are of little use unless supported by a reasonably strong mobile force maintained in this region. To rely for defense solely upon the fixed defenses of a war upon a mobile force shipped in from the East is to invite disaster."

"The harbor defenses maintained in this region are reasonably strong, but they are of little use unless supported by a reasonably strong mobile force maintained in this region. To rely for defense solely upon the fixed defenses of a war upon a mobile force shipped in from the East is to invite disaster."

"The harbor defenses maintained in this region are reasonably strong, but they are of little use unless supported by a reasonably strong mobile force maintained in this region. To rely for defense solely upon the fixed defenses of a war upon a mobile force shipped in from the East is to invite disaster."

"The harbor defenses maintained in this region are reasonably strong, but they are of little use unless supported by a reasonably strong mobile force maintained in this region. To rely for defense solely upon the fixed defenses of a war upon a mobile force shipped in from the East is to invite disaster."

"The harbor defenses maintained in this region are reasonably strong, but they are of little use unless supported by a reasonably strong mobile force maintained in this region. To rely for defense solely upon the fixed defenses of a war upon a mobile force shipped in from the East is to invite disaster."

"The harbor defenses maintained in this region are reasonably strong, but they are of little use unless supported by a reasonably strong mobile force maintained in this region. To rely for defense solely upon the fixed defenses of a war upon a mobile force shipped in from the East is to invite disaster."

"The harbor defenses maintained in this region are reasonably strong, but they are of little use unless supported by a reasonably strong mobile force maintained in this region. To rely for defense solely upon the fixed defenses of a war upon a mobile force shipped in from the East is to invite disaster."

"The harbor defenses maintained in this region are reasonably strong, but they are of little use unless supported by a reasonably strong mobile force maintained in this region. To rely for defense solely upon the fixed defenses of a war upon a mobile force shipped in from the East is to invite disaster."

"The harbor defenses maintained in this region are reasonably strong, but they are of little use unless supported by a reasonably strong mobile force maintained in this region. To rely for defense solely upon the fixed defenses of a war upon a mobile force shipped in from the East is to invite disaster."

"The harbor defenses maintained in this region are reasonably strong, but they are of little use unless supported by a reasonably strong mobile force maintained in this region. To rely for defense solely upon the fixed defenses of a war upon a mobile force shipped in from the East is to invite disaster."

"The harbor defenses maintained in this region are reasonably strong, but they are of little use unless supported by a reasonably strong mobile force maintained in this region. To rely for defense solely upon the fixed defenses of a war upon a mobile force shipped in from the East is to invite disaster."

"The harbor defenses maintained in this region are reasonably strong, but they are of little use unless supported by a reasonably strong mobile force maintained in this region. To rely for defense solely upon the fixed defenses of a war upon a mobile force shipped in from the East is to invite disaster."

"The harbor defenses maintained in this region are reasonably strong, but they are of little use unless supported by a reasonably strong mobile force maintained in this region. To rely for defense solely upon the fixed defenses of a war upon a mobile force shipped in from the East is to invite disaster."

"The harbor defenses maintained in this region are reasonably strong, but they are of little use unless supported by a reasonably strong mobile force maintained in this region. To rely for defense solely upon the fixed defenses of a war upon a mobile force shipped in from the East is to invite disaster."

"The harbor defenses maintained in this region are reasonably strong, but they are of little use unless supported by a reasonably strong mobile force maintained in this region. To rely for defense solely upon the fixed defenses of a war upon a mobile force shipped in from the East is to invite disaster."

"The harbor defenses maintained in this region are reasonably strong, but they are of little use unless supported by a reasonably strong mobile force maintained in this region. To rely for defense solely upon the fixed defenses of a war upon a mobile force shipped in from the East is to invite disaster."

"The harbor defenses maintained in this region are reasonably strong, but they are of little use unless supported by a reasonably strong mobile force maintained in this region. To rely for defense solely upon the fixed defenses of a war upon a mobile force shipped in from the East is to invite disaster."

"The harbor defenses maintained in this region are reasonably strong, but they are of little use unless supported by a reasonably strong mobile force maintained in this region. To rely for defense solely upon the fixed defenses of a war upon a mobile force shipped in from the East is to invite disaster."

"The harbor defenses maintained in this region are reasonably strong, but they are of little use unless supported by a reasonably strong mobile force maintained in this region. To rely for defense solely upon the fixed defenses of a war upon a mobile force shipped in from the East is to invite disaster."

California Area—There are five transcontinental lines of railway entering California—the Western Pacific and Southern Pacific by the passes through the Sierras northeast of Sacramento; the Atchafalaya, Topeka and Santa Fe and the San Pedro, Los Angeles and Salt Lake via Daguerre's Pass northeast of Los Angeles; and the Southern Pacific via the Salton Sea and Gorgona Pass southeast of Los Angeles."

"There are no other passes through the Sierras that have been considered practicable. There is no railroad running south into Lower California. Only one railroad, the Southern Pacific, runs north into Oregon. As in the Puget Sound region, communication with the East is largely dependent upon structures readily destroyed by explosives and impossible of restoration to service within a definite time; California and the greater centers of population are separated by wide expanses of sparsely settled country."

"To transport promptly large bodies of troops into California would be difficult, if not impossible, in face of opposition to the advance of the invader would have a most fertile region at its back, while the reverse would be the situation with us."

"The harbor defenses maintained in this region are reasonably strong, but they are of little use unless supported by a reasonably strong mobile force maintained in this region. To rely for defense solely upon the fixed defenses of a war upon a mobile force shipped in from the East is to invite disaster."

"Along Atlantic Coast. In case of war with a first class power on the Atlantic, that portion of our country lying between the Atlantic and the Gulf of Mexico is undoubtedly the primary object of an invader. While all other points along the Atlantic and Gulf coasts and all points on the Gulf of Mexico would undoubtedly be in danger, the danger would be secondary to that of the north Atlantic States above named. Here also the harbor defenses are reasonably strong, but they are of little use unless supported by a reasonably strong mobile force maintained in this region. To rely for defense solely upon the fixed defenses of a war upon a mobile force shipped in from the East is to invite disaster."

"The harbor defenses maintained in this region are reasonably strong, but they are of little use unless supported by a reasonably strong mobile force maintained in this region. To rely for defense solely upon the fixed defenses of a war upon a mobile force shipped in from the East is to invite disaster."

"The harbor defenses maintained in this region are reasonably strong, but they are of little use unless supported by a reasonably strong mobile force maintained in this region. To rely for defense solely upon the fixed defenses of a war upon a mobile force shipped in from the East is to invite disaster."

"The harbor defenses maintained in this region are reasonably strong, but they are of little use unless supported by a reasonably strong mobile force maintained in this region. To rely for defense solely upon the fixed defenses of a war upon a mobile force shipped in from the East is to invite disaster."

"The harbor defenses maintained in this region are reasonably strong, but they are of